The Alawite Massacre

An Orthodox Sunni Perspective on Justice, Sectarianism, and the Post-Assad Era

The recent violence in Syria’s coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartous, where over 400 people—predominantly Alawite civilians—have been killed since March 6, 2025, demands a principled response from the Muslim ummah, especially those of us who follow the Orthodox Sunni path. Rooted in the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), we are called to uphold justice, extend mercy, and protect the sanctity of life, regardless of sect or creed. The killings of Alawites by forces aligned with Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Julani), challenge the moral foundations of the post-Assad era and compel us to scrutinize the actions of those who govern in Islam’s name.

The Context: A Spark and a Firestorm

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), the violence erupted on March 6 when gunmen loyal to the ousted Bashar al-Assad attacked government security forces in Latakia, killing 16 personnel. These attackers, presumed to be Alawite militias, given the region’s demographics and historical allegiance to Assad, struck at a time when Syria’s new leadership seeks to consolidate power after his fall in December 2024. The government’s response was swift and severe: security forces, alongside allied gunmen, launched a counteroffensive that spiraled into massacres, claiming over 400 lives, including more than 340 Alawite civilians. SOHR reports these deaths resulted from “field executions,” with homes looted and villages devastated in reprisals.

From an Orthodox Sunni perspective, the initial assault by Alawite loyalists was an act of aggression that cannot be condoned. The Qur’an states, “And do not transgress; indeed, Allah does not love the transgressors” (Surah al-Baqarah, 2:190). Yet, the disproportionate retaliation—slaughtering civilians, including women and children—violates the Sunnah’s clear prohibitions. The Prophet (peace be upon him) commanded, “Do not kill a woman, nor a child, nor an old man” (Sunan Abi Dawud).

Such acts, even in response to provocation, betray the justice we are bound to uphold.

Al-Julani’s Leadership: A Test of Islamic Governance

Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now leads Syria’s transitional government. His administration has pledged stability and inclusivity, distancing itself from the sectarian tyranny of Assad’s rule. Yet, the massacres in Latakia and Tartous cast doubt on these promises. While no definitive evidence proves al-Julani directly ordered the killings—his government denies targeting civilians and claims to investigate violations—he bears responsibility as the leader to ensure his forces adhere to justice, not vengeance.

Orthodox Sunni Islam demands that rulers govern with ‘adl (justice) and rahma (mercy). The Qur’an instructs, “O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives” (Surah an-Nisa, 4:135). If security forces or their allies have perpetrated war crimes, al-Julani’s failure to restrain them undermines his legitimacy. Reports of “allied gunmen” operating alongside official units suggest a fractured command, raising questions about his control over the diverse factions now shaping Syria’s security apparatus. This chaos echoes the civil war’s lawlessness, not the order of a righteous state.

The Alawites: Aggressors or Victims?

The Alawites, a minority sect comprising 10-12% of Syria’s population, have long been central to the country’s sectarian divide. Elevated under Hafez al-Assad and sustained by his son Bashar, they dominated the regime’s power structure, often at the expense of the Sunni majority. The March 6 attack by Assad loyalists reinforces their image as holdouts resisting the new order, fueling perceptions of collective guilt among some Sunnis. Yet, the civilians killed in the reprisals—over 340 by SOHR’s count—were not combatants.

They were villagers, families, and non-fighters caught in a cycle of violence.

As Orthodox Sunnis, we must reject blanket condemnation. The Qur’an declares, “No bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another” (Surah al-An’am, 6:164). The Alawite militias who struck on March 6 were aggressors, but the broader community cannot justly bear their punishment. Many Alawites lived under Assad’s coercion, not as willing architects of his tyranny. To equate them all with the regime is to embrace the same sectarian logic that fractured Syria for decades.

Sectarianism: A Poison in the Ummah

The targeting of Alawite civilians by government forces and their allies, widely reported as Sunni-led, suggests a sectarian undercurrent to the violence. SOHR’s accounts of executions and destruction point to reprisals driven by revenge, a grim echo of the civil war’s worst excesses. Orthodox Sunni doctrine, rooted in the Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, condemns sectarianism as a deviation from Islamic unity. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “The believers are like one body; if one part of it suffers, the whole body responds with fever and sleeplessness” (Sahih Muslim). Killing Alawites for their sect, rather than their actions, risks widening Syria’s wounds, not healing them.

Al-Julani’s past with HTS, a group once tied to al-Qaeda, amplifies these concerns. Though he has sought to reframe his leadership as inclusive—engaging with Kurds, Christians, and Druze—the absence of similar outreach to Alawites stands out amid this violence. True Islamic governance protects all under its charge, as the Prophet (peace be upon him) did with Medina’s diverse communities. The current trajectory suggests a failure to rise above historical grievances.

A Call for Accountability and Reflection

As Orthodox Sunnis, we must demand accountability. If al-Julani’s forces have committed atrocities, investigations must be transparent and perpetrators punished, not shielded by vague promises. The international community, including Turkiye, a key supporter of the new government, should press for restraint and clarity, as its Foreign Ministry has hinted at unease over escalating “provocations.” Silence or complicity risks legitimizing a regime that mirrors Assad’s brutality in a different form.

For Syria’s people—Sunni, Alawite, and beyond—this is a moment to reflect. The fall of Assad opened a path to reconciliation, not retribution. We must ask ourselves: have we let hatred distort our commitment to the Sunnah? The Qur’an warns, “And let not the hatred of a people for having obstructed you from al-Masjid al-Haram lead you to transgress” (Surah al-Ma’idah, 5:2). The Alawite deaths test al-Julani’s leadership, Syria’s future, and our adherence to Islam’s ethical core.

Conclusion - Toward a Just Syria

The violence in Latakia and Tartous is not a triumph for Sunnis nor a defeat for Alawites—it is a tragedy for all Syrians. As an Orthodox Sunni, I pray for a Syria where justice prevails over vengeance, where the Sunnah guides rather than justifies, and where innocent blood ceases to flow.

Al-Julani faces a choice: to embody the mercy of the Prophet (peace be upon him) or to repeat the oppression of his predecessors.

That choice is his, but the judgment belongs to Allah SWT, the Just, the Merciful.